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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

1

The Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics (“Stein
Center”) is based at Fordham University School of Law
and sponsors programs, develops publications, supports
scholarship on contemporary issues of law and ethics,
and encourages professional and public institutions to
integrate moral perspectives into their work. Over the
past decade, the Stein Center and affiliated Fordham
Law faculty have examined the ethical dimensions of the
administration of criminal justice, including the ethical
and historical dimensions of the death penalty and
execution methods. The Stein Center has submitted
amicus briefs in three prior cases in which the Court has
been asked to examine methods of execution: Bryan v.
Moore, 528 U.S. 960 (1999); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 43
(2008) (citing Stein Center brief); and Glossip v. Gross,
576 U.S. 863 (2015).
Implementation of lethal injection as an execution
method implicates ethical questions important to the
Stein Center. The evolution of execution methods in the
United States generally suggests a public consensus
opposed to the infliction of severe pain and suffering in
the course of executing individuals sentenced to death.
At the same time, it is doubtful whether in practice
1

Pursuant to Rule 37.3, the parties have consented to the filing of
this brief. Pursuant to Rule 37.6, no counsel for a party authored
this brief “in whole or in part,” and no counsel or party made a
monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or
submission of this brief. No person other than amicus curiae, its
members, or its counsel made a monetary contribution to its
preparation or submission.
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execution methods achieve that goal. There are serious
concerns whether legislatures, courts, and prison
officials have responded to the risks associated with the
implementation of lethal injection in an ethical manner.
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Since this Court’s decision in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S.
35 (2008), the composition of lethal injection protocols
implemented by States has been defined by rapid
changes, experimentation with new drugs and drug
combinations, and reversion to previously abandoned
protocols. With rare exception, such changes have been
implemented not by State legislatures, but by prison
officials charged with carrying out lethal injection
executions. Against this backdrop, this brief urges the
Court to grant Petitioner’s request for certiorari to
challenge Ohio’s lethal injection protocol for two main
reasons:
(1) Judicial review of challenges to lethal injection
protocols is necessary in light of the historical
development of execution methods and such protocols.
Historically, States have moved toward new methods in
an effort to execute inmates in a humane manner free
from unnecessary pain. These changes came about as
society became more aware of the risks associated with
a certain execution method. However, when States
adopted lethal injection as an execution method, the
great majority of States left statutes purposefully vague
as to the lethal injection procedure. Thus, States largely
left the composition of their lethal injection protocols in
the hands of unelected prison officials who are generally
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not subject to public scrutiny or oversight. But prison
officials—including those in Ohio—have continued to
adopt protocols lacking a sufficient scientific or medical
basis. The responsibility for ensuring that executions
and related protocols do not risk unnecessary cruelty or
lingering death, in violation of the Eighth Amendment,
thus lies with the courts.
(2) By allowing Ohio to categorically reject
Petitioner’s proposed alternative drug protocol on the
basis that no other State has used it in an execution, the
Sixth Circuit’s decision effectively forecloses judicial
review of execution methods and is contrary to States’
historical experimentation with execution methods.
Careful judicial scrutiny of evolving execution methods
is critical to aiding the search for more humane methods
and ensuring compliance with the Eighth Amendment.
Not only does the Sixth Circuit’s decision eviscerate this
scrutiny, but States’ frequent historical experimentation
with execution methods also belies any State’s claimed
reticence to implement a protocol proposed by an
inmate. Thus, States should not be permitted to
categorically reject an inmate’s proposed alternative
execution method. Ohio’s rejection of Petitioner’s
proposed drug protocol—a one-drug protocol using
secobarbital—is
particularly
grievous
because
secobarbital is used frequently in physician-assisted
suicides in the United States, and Ohio has historically
been the State most willing to try new lethal injection
protocols.

4
ARGUMENT
I. JUDICIAL
REVIEW
OF
METHOD-OFEXECUTION CHALLENGES IS ESSENTIAL
TO EDUCATE THE PUBLIC AND TO
ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH EIGHTH
AMENDMENT STANDARDS.
Since the founding of the United States, the
evolution of execution methods has often been driven by
the public’s increasing awareness of the risks associated
with a particular method. This awareness placed
pressure on State legislatures to implement a new
execution method. Since the adoption of lethal injection,
however, the great majority of State legislatures have
delegated the composition of the specific lethal injection
protocols to unelected prison officials generally not
subject to public scrutiny and oversight. Yet prison
officials have continued to adopt protocols lacking a
sufficient scientific or medical basis. This dangerous
dynamic has enhanced the importance of judicial review
of lethal injection protocols to ensure that executions do
not risk unnecessary cruelty or lingering death. Even
when a drug protocol like the one at issue in this case has
previously been reviewed, the development of new
evidence showing risks of severe pain and needless
suffering requires courts to be vigilant in ensuring that
the administration of lethal injection comports with the
Eighth Amendment.

5
A. Historically, Public Awareness Spurred By
The Unnecessary Risk Of Pain And Suffering
Of A Prior Execution Method Drove State
Legislatures To Adopt A New Method.
As is well documented, the federal government and
every State that has the death penalty employ lethal
injection as the method of execution. Prior to lethal
injection, States switched methods when pre-existing
methods were shown in practice to embody a high risk
of painful or lingering death. In large part, the
coordinated move from one execution method to another
took place by legislative dictate rather than judicial
decree. See generally Deborah W. Denno, When
Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox
Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection
and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63 (2002).
With the exception of a few States that permitted use of
the firing squad, the general historical trend in the
United States led to the transition from hanging to
electrocution, which gave way briefly to reliance on the
gas chamber, before settling on lethal injection.
Hanging. Hanging was the predominant execution
method in the United States in the 19th century. By
1853, hanging had become “the nearly universal form of
execution in the United States and 48 States once
imposed death by this method.” Campbell v. Wood, 511
U.S. 1119, 1119 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted). After the public witnessed gruesomely
botched hangings that involved decapitations and slow
strangulations, legislatures searched for a more humane
execution method. Stuart Banner, THE DEATH
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PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 172–75 (2003); In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890) (describing the quest
to determine “whether the science of the present day”
could find a “less barbarous manner” of execution than
hanging) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord
Barr v. Lee, No. 20A8, 2020 WL 3964985, at *1 (U.S. July
14, 2020) (noting that States seek to “develop[] new
methods, such as lethal injection, thought to be less
painful and more humane than traditional methods, like
hanging”).
Today, no State uses hanging as an execution
method—a sharp contrast to the method’s dominance
historically. See Deborah W. Denno, THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT AND ITS FUTURE IN A NEW AGE OF
PUNISHMENT (Meghan J. Ryan et al. eds., 2020)
[hereinafter Denno, EIGHTH AMENDMENT]. The last
2
hanging in the United States took place in 1996, and
only three hangings have occurred between 1965 and
3
1996. See id. at 231.
Electrocution. By 1915, twelve States had switched
from hanging to electrocution, in reliance upon the
“belief that electrocution is less painful and more
humane than hanging.” Malloy v. South Carolina, 237
U.S. 180, 185 (1915). Throughout the early part of the
20th century, the vast majority of States turned to the

2

Hanging, DEATH PENALTY CURRICULUM, https://deathpenalty
curriculum.org/student/c/about/methods/hanging.htm.
3

Against this background, the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of hanging,
as though it were a viable option to which execution methods can be
compared, is invalid and uninformed. See Pet’r’s Br. 14–16.
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electric chair as the preferred execution method. See
Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 130 tbl. 2.
Over the years, accounts of gruesomely botched
electrocutions were widely reported. See Deborah W.
Denno,
Getting
to
Death:
Are
Executions
Constitutional?, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 319, app. 2.A at 412
(1997) (describing examples of botched executions).
Following a particularly gruesome electrocution in
Florida, this Court agreed to examine the
constitutionality of electrocution. See Bryan, 528 U.S.
960. But the Court dismissed the writ as improvidently
granted after the Florida legislature altered its
execution method to permit an inmate to choose
between electrocution and lethal injection. See Bryan v.
Moore, 528 U.S. 1133 (2000); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 922.105. By
that time, public awareness of the risk that
electrocutions would cause unnecessary pain and
4
lingering death had reached a high point.
Ohio adopted lethal injection as an alternative to
electrocution in 1993. Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 89; see
id. tbl. 3. In 2001, when an inmate chose electrocution for
his execution method, Ohio’s prison officials asked the
Ohio legislature to abolish the use of electrocution
because they were concerned that “the 104-year-old
electric chair” would malfunction. Id. That same year,
4

See Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How
Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
49, 62–63 (2007) (describing the 1999 botched execution of Allen Lee
Davis, who suffered deep burns and bleeding, color photographs of
which were viewed by millions of people on the Florida Supreme
Court’s website); Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 78–79.
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Ohio officially abandoned electrocution in favor of lethal
injection as the State’s sole execution method. Id.
By 2009, electrocution remained an option in only six
States. Denno, EIGHTH AMENDMENT at 227. Two state
courts had even ruled electrocution unconstitutional
under state constitutions. See Dawson v. State, 554
S.E.2d 137, 139 (Ga. 2001) (“whether a particular
punishment is cruel and unusual is not a static concept,
but instead changes in recognition of the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 278 (Neb. 2008) (noting
legislatures “have recognized that early assumptions
about an instantaneous and painless death were simply
incorrect and that there are more humane methods of
carrying out the death penalty.”).
From 2009 to 2019, “seven inmates selected
electrocution over lethal injection.” Denno, EIGHTH
AMENDMENT at 228. At least three inmates selected
electrocution out of concern about the pain associated
with lethal injection. Id. at 228–29.
Lethal Gas. Early problems with electrocution—
together with the continued brutality of hangings—
caused some States to experiment with the gas chamber
as an alternative to hanging. Nevada was the first State
to authorize lethal gas in 1921. Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J.
at 83. Nevada initially sought to rely on lethal gas
because it was the method used in the relatively peaceful
killings of animals. See State v. Gee Jon, 211 P. 676, 681
(Nev. 1923). At the time, Nevada’s deputy attorney
general persuaded two state legislators that the method

9
would be more humane than hanging or the firing squad.
Banner, supra, at 196.
By 1955, ten additional States had adopted lethal gas.
Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 83. But, again, prison officials
were tasked with figuring out the details of exactly how
to carry out the method on human beings. Banner,
supra, at 197. Over time, it became clear that inmates
did not die peacefully by breathing in lethal gas while
sleeping: death lingered and inmates often urinated on
themselves, moaned, twitched, and painfully convulsed
for minutes before finally dying. See, e.g., Gray v. Lucas,
710 F.2d 1048, 1058–59 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Denno, 82
IOWA L. REV. at app. 2.B. at 425. In addition, the gas
chamber carried with it lasting association with the
abhorrent mass killings in Nazi Germany. The gas
chamber thus fell out of favor.
Today, three States provide nitrogen hypoxia as an
alternative to lethal injection or as a substitute if lethal
injection is deemed unconstitutional or otherwise
5
unavailable. Yet, none of these States has ever even
attempted to use nitrogen hypoxia as an execution
NFUIPE  OPS IBWF UIFZ QSPWJEFE TVGGJDJFOUMZ TQFDJmD
information about how such a method would be
implemented. Denno, EIGHTH AMENDMENT at 231.

5

The three states are Alabama (in 2018), which provides nitrogen
hypoxia as an alternative to lethal injection, and Mississippi (in
2017) and Oklahoma (in 2015), which provide the gas as a substitute
if lethal injection is deemed unconstitutional or otherwise
unavailable. Denno, EIGHTH AMENDMENT at 231.

10
B. State Legislatures Delegated Implementation
Of Lethal Injection Methods To Prison
Officials, Insulating That Process From Public
Scrutiny Even As It Has Appeared To Cause
Needless Pain.
1. The Development Of Lethal Injection
Protocols And Widespread Adoption Of The
Three-Drug Protocol Lacked Any Reasoned
Consideration.
Public scrutiny of execution methods intensified in
the 1970s after this Court affirmed the constitutionality
of the death penalty. States turned to lethal injection,
with Oklahoma leading the way. Denno, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. at 70, 73–75. Beginning immediately after
Oklahoma adopted lethal injection, other States
switched to the method, before it had been used in an
execution. Baze, 553 U.S. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring
in the judgment). Texas adopted lethal injection the very
next day. Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. at 78. By 1982,
when Texas conducted the first lethal injection
execution, six States had enacted lethal injection
statutes. Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos
Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1341 cht. 1 (2014).
Another fifteen States adopted lethal injection from
1983 to 1988, and twelve more States switched to lethal
injection from 1994 to 2002. Id.
Like Oklahoma, other States left their lethal
injection statutes intentionally vague. See Denno, 63
OHIO ST. L.J. at 68–69; Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. at
93. For example, Ohio’s lethal injection statute provides
that death sentences are to be carried out by “a lethal
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injection of a drug or combination of drugs of sufficient
dosage to quickly and painlessly cause death.” Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2949.22. This delegation left the
responsibility for developing execution protocols to
corrections officials who had no specialized expertise.6
Prison officials thus had “unfettered discretion to
determine all protocol and procedures, most notably the
chemicals to be used, for a State execution.” Hobbs v.
Jones, 412 S.W.3d 844, 854 (Ark. 2012) (discussing
Arkansas statute).
Ultimately, the federal government and almost
every State that adopted lethal injection as an execution
method, including Ohio, adopted the original three-drug
protocol that Oklahoma had initially developed—sodium
thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium
chloride. Glossip, 576 U.S. at 868–69, 873 (noting at least
30 States of the 36 States that use lethal injection
employed the original three-drug protocol); Cooey v.
Strickland, 589 F.3d 210, 215 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting Ohio
adopted the three-drug protocol). But, as this Court
recognized, “it is undisputed that the States using lethal
injection adopted the protocol first developed by
Oklahoma without significant independent review of the
procedure.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 43 n.1; see also Beardslee
6 In 1978, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected a challenge

to a Texas lethal injection statute, concluding that the Director of
the Department of Corrections’s authority to choose the lethal
substance and procedure “d[id] not constitute an improper
delegation of the [S]tate’s legislative power.” Denno, 82 IOWA L.
REV. at 375 n.328 (citing Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1978)).
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v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064, 1074 n.11 (9th Cir. 2005)
(noting California’s protocol was “informally” based on
Texas’s protocol, and “the precise protocol was never
subjected to the rigors of scientific analysis.”).
States copied the three-drug protocol despite the
concerns that arose about it almost immediately. Soon
after Oklahoma adopted the method, Oklahoma’s
medical examiner, A. Jay Chapman, who assisted with
devising the protocol, “said that if the death-dealing
drug is not administered properly, the convict may not
die and could be subjected to severe muscle pain.” Jim
Killackey, Execution Drug Like Anesthesia, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, May 12, 1977, at 1. When Texas became
the first State to employ the method in 1982, the Texas
warden mistakenly mixed all three drugs into a single
syringe, causing the mixture to turn into “white sludge.”
Stephen Trombley, THE EXECUTION PROTOCOL: INSIDE
AMERICA’S CAPITAL PUNISHMENT INDUSTRY 74–75
(1992).
2. State Prison Officials Continue To Rely Upon
Insufficient Scientific And Medical Study In
Modifying Lethal Injection Protocols.
Since this Court’s decision in Baze, the landscape of
lethal injection protocols has changed dramatically.
Despite the Court’s approval of Kentucky’s three-drug
protocol of sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide,
and potassium chloride, States have subsequently
experimented with various new drug protocols. Such
changes resulted from either court intervention or
practical considerations as opposed to medical or
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scientific study. Indeed, these rapid changes have
continued to accelerate.
In the years after Baze, all States began modifying
the precise drugs used in lethal injection protocols due
to pragmatic considerations. Because of drug shortages,
prison officials were forced to make substitutions for the
first drug from the original three-drug sequence, sodium
thiopental, in both one-drug and three-drug protocols.
Denno, 102 GEO. L.J. at 1360–65, cht. 3; see Glossip, 576
U.S. at 868–71. As a result, corrections officials sought
out both alternative sources for sodium thiopental and
substitutes for the drug, including pentobarbital, which
itself became the subject of shortages.
Many States have turned to midazolam as a
substitute for sodium thiopental and pentobarbital. See
Glossip, 576 U.S. at 871. Ohio first adopted midazolam as
part of its multi-drug protocol in 2016. In re Ohio
Execution Protocol, 860 F.3d 881, 885 (6th Cir. 2017).
Today, ten States list midazolam as part of their lethal
injection protocol, two of which use the drug as part of a
two-drug protocol, while the other eight employ it as
part of a three-drug protocol. Denno, EIGHTH
AMENDMENT at 221–22, cht. 4. Although Glossip found
the use of midazolam was not unconstitutional, it did so
because the district court’s factual finding on the level of
suffering caused by midazolam was not clearly
erroneous based on the specific factual evidence and
circumstances presented there. See 576 U.S. at 881, 883–
84, 890–93.
Since Glossip, the evidence against midazolam’s
constitutionality has become stronger. The consensus in
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the scientific and medical communities regarding
midazolam’s glaring deficiencies as a lethal agent has
only solidified. See, e.g., McGehee v. Hutchinson, No.
4:17-CV-00179, 2020 WL 2841589, at *5–7 (E.D. Ark.
May 31, 2020) (describing the American Society of
Anesthesiologists’ rejection of midazolam as an
anesthetic, and the FDA’s recognition that midazolam
can
cause “airway
obstruction,
apnea,
and
cardiopulmonary arrest”). Indeed, the evidence relied on
by the District Court here showed midazolam lacks the
necessary analgesic effects to dull what would otherwise
be excruciating pain caused by the second and third
drugs in the typical three-drug protocol (the paralytic
and the euthanizing agent). In re Ohio Execution
Protocol Litig., No. 2:11-CV-1016, 2019 WL 244488, at
*21 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2019) (“Dr. Exline also opined
that midazolam does not have analgesic effects and may
potentially increase pain perception.”), aff’d, 946 F.3d
287 (6th Cir. 2019). Experts testifying before the
District Court further explained that midazolam itself
can cause excruciating pain, especially when
administered at the levels commonly used in executions.
Id. at *15–16. Such high doses of midazolam have been
associated with pulmonary edemas, wherein recipients’
lungs are flooded by their own bodily fluids, causing
suffocation. Id. at *15.
Moreover, since 2014, the number of States with
botched executions attributed to midazolam have risen
steadily. In 2014, Ohio executed Dennis McGuire using a
two-drug protocol that consisted of midazolam and the
painkiller hydromorphone. Corinna Barrett Lain, The
Politics of Botched Executions, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 825,
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828 (2015). Witnesses to the execution watched with
horror as McGuire “gasped, choked, and repeatedly
clenched his fists” after the drugs were administered. Id.
at 829; see also In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig., 235
F. Supp. 3d 892, 905 (S.D. Ohio), vacated, 860 F.3d 881
(6th Cir. 2017). While the typical execution should last
no longer than ten minutes, McGuire’s stretched for
almost thirty. Barrett Lain, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. at 828–
30. The 2018 execution of Robert Van Hook
demonstrated many of the problems observers
witnessed in McGuire’s execution. In re Ohio Execution
Protocol Litig., 2019 WL 244488 at *13. A reporter
covering Van Hook’s execution described his “labored”
breathing, “wheezing,” and “flushed” face after his
injection with midazolam. Id.
Alabama’s experience with midazolam was hardly
any different. According to those who witnessed the
2016 execution of Ronald Smith, after receiving a 500 mg
dose of midazolam, Smith began “coughing, heaving,
flailing, or attempting to flail arms, clenching and
unclenching [his] fists.” See In re Ohio Execution
Protocol Litig., 235 F. Supp. 3d at 906. Just as with
McGuire, Smith reportedly lingered near death for over
thirty minutes before finally passing—far longer than
the ten minutes expected for a problem-free execution.
Kent Faulk, Alabama Death Row Inmate Ronald Bert
Smith Heaved, Coughed for 13 Minutes During
Execution, BIRMINGHAM REAL-TIME NEWS (Dec. 8,
2016), https://www.al.com/news/birmingham/2016/12/ala
bama_death_row_inmate_is_se.html.
In fact, evidence of botched executions involving
midazolam exists in numerous States, including
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Oklahoma, Florida, Arizona, Tennessee, and Virginia.
See Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721, 725 (10th Cir.)
(describing Clayton Lockett’s botched execution in
Oklahoma, which lasted for forty-three minutes), aff’d,
576 U.S. 863 (2015); In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig.,
235 F. Supp. 3d at 906 (describing Paul Howell opening
his eyes during the consciousness check after receiving
midazolam in Florida); id. (describing Joseph Wood
“gasp[ing] and try[ing] to breathe until his death almost
two hours after the process began” in Arizona); id at 907
(describing Rick Gray’s “labored breathing, gasping,
snoring, and other audible and visible activity” during
his execution in Virginia); West v. Parker, No. 3:19-CV00006, 2019 WL 2341406, at *13 (M.D. Tenn. June 3, 2019)
(noting that Billy Ray Irick “gasped for air, he hacked
and coughed, his face turned deep purple and he moved
his head” after receiving midazolam for his execution in
Tennessee), aff’d, 783 F.3d 506 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
140 S. Ct. 25 (2019).
In light of midazolam’s well-documented failures,
multiple States have recently sought alternatives. For
instance, in 2017, Florida officially replaced midazolam
with etomidate as the first drug in its protocol, becoming
the first State to adopt that chemical for its executions.
In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig., 235 F. Supp. 3d at
906. Arizona similarly agreed to discontinue its use of
midazolam in 2016 as part of a larger settlement
agreement regarding its execution practices. Id. And in
2018, a Nevada judge halted the execution of Scott
Dozier over concerns about the drug. Robbie Gonzalez,
Why Nevada’s Execution Drug Cocktail Is So
Controversial,
WIRED
(July
11,
2017),
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https://www.wired.com/story/the-untested-drugs-atthe-heart-of-nevadas-execution-controversy/.
Other
States that have recently amended their lethal injection
7
protocols have also adopted non-midazolam chemicals.
Notably, the federal government chose not to employ
midazolam in resuming executions after a nearly two
decade hiatus. Lee, 2020 WL 3964985, at *1.
Since the beginning of 2019 alone, prison officials
have employed three different drug combinations in
8
lethal injection executions —a sharp contrast to States’
use of the same three-drug protocol for over thirty years
until 2010.

7

See Ward v. Carter, 90 N.E.3d 660, 661 (Ind.) (upholding the state’s
switch to brevital, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride
for its three-drug protocol), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 240 (2018); Mitch
Smith, Fentanyl Used to Execute Nebraska Inmate, in a First for
U.S.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
14,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/us/carey-dean-moorenebraska-execution-fentanyl.html (describing Nebraska’s recent
switch to a four-drug protocol using diazepam, fentanyl citrate,
cisatracurium besylate, and potassium chloride).
8

The three drug combinations were: (1) a three-drug protocol
using midazolam; (2) a one-drug protocol using pentobarbital; and
(3) a three-drug protocol using etomidate. See Execution List
2019,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CENTER,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/2019 (last updated Dec. 11,
2019) (last visited Aug. 31, 2020); Execution List 2020, D EATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CENTER,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/2020 (last updated Aug. 28,
2020) (last visited Aug. 31, 2020).
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C. Judicial Scrutiny Of Prison Officials’
Administration Of Lethal Injection Is
Necessary To Ensure Compliance With The
Eighth Amendment.
As the history demonstrates, States adopted lethal
injection generally and numerous drug protocols
specifically without serious study or independent
analysis. States uniformly delegated to prison officials
the details of lethal injections. Historical practice and
contemporary evidence indicate that prison officials
likely lack the necessary expertise to develop lethal
injection protocols and fail to rely upon scientific or
medical study. Yet these prison officials, operating
outside the public eye, are tasked with developing
procedures by which inmates will be executed. Because
legislatures have delegated responsibility for such
protocols to unelected officials, it is imperative that
courts not insulate a State’s protocol from challenge.
Rather, the judiciary must provide a check on the
exercise of such authority. In light of the recent trend
toward constantly changing protocols, which has
accelerated precipitously over the last decade, resulting
in numerous botched executions, the courts have the
constitutional responsibility to ensure such procedures
comport with the Eighth Amendment.
For a quarter century, States followed the threedrug protocol this Court approved in Baze. But prison
officials did not arrive at the three-drug protocol after
independent analysis and evaluation. Rather, the
protocol was “the product of administrative convenience
and a stereotyped reaction to an issue, rather than a
careful analysis of relevant considerations favoring or
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disfavoring a conclusion.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 75 (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). In fact, “[i]n the majority of
States that use the three-drug protocol, the drugs were
selected by unelected department of correction officials
with no specialized medical knowledge and without the
benefit of expert assistance or guidance.” Id. at 74–75.
Following Baze, States “have changed their lethal
injection protocols in inconsistent ways that bear little
resemblance to the original protocol evaluated in Baze
and even differ from one execution to the next within the
same state.” Denno, 102 GEO. L.J. at 1331. Rather than
correct the unreasoned manner in which protocols had
been adopted in the past, however, officials prioritize
concern for administrative convenience over the need
for a humane execution. Thus, as with the original threedrug protocol, such changes are not the result of careful
deliberation. For this reason, “their drug selections are
not entitled to the kind of deference afforded legislative
decisions.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring
in the judgment).
Ohio falls into this general pattern. Ohio has
implemented several different lethal injection protocols
since its adoption of lethal injection as an execution
method. Initially, without independent analysis, Ohio
mirrored Oklahoma’s original three-drug protocol that
included sodium thiopental as the first drug. When
sodium thiopental became unavailable, Ohio followed
Oklahoma’s lead again by using pentobarbital, this time
implementing its own variation by using pentobarbital
in a one-drug protocol. Ohio prison officials then turned
to a two-drug protocol of midazolam and hydromorphone
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when pentobarbital became unavailable, resulting in the
botched execution of Dennis McGuire in 2014. Following
Florida’s lead this time, Ohio implemented the lethal
injection protocol at issue in this case without
independent evaluation.
Under these circumstances, judicial review provides
a necessary means by which to examine the
constitutionality of the chosen lethal injection drugs,
procedures, and administration. See, e.g., Morales v.
Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 981 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding
California’s protocol unconstitutional); Harbison v.
Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 895, 903 (M.D. Tenn. 2007)
(ruling State’s failure to adopt one-drug protocol
recommended by state-commissioned study violated the
Eighth Amendment), vacated, 571 F.3d 531 (6th Cir.
2009); Taylor v. Crawford, No. 2:07-cv-04129, 2006 WL
1779035, at *8 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006) (concluding that
Missouri’s lethal injection procedure presented
unconstitutional risk due to maladministration); see also
Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1127 (2019)
(rejecting the categorical approach to determining
whether a punishment violates the Eighth Amendment,
and reaffirming the judicial role in comparing
alternative methods).
The plurality opinion in Baze did not seek to insulate
lethal injection protocols from scrutiny. Baze, 553 U.S.
at 62. The opinion specifically contemplated changes to
the method “in light of new developments, to ensure
humane capital punishment.” Id. As a result, in light of
new evidence, each combination of drugs must be
evaluated independently to determine whether it inflicts
severe pain and needless suffering.
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Such judicial oversight would not “substantially
intrude on the role of state legislatures in implementing
their execution procedures,” id. at 51, because
legislatures do not concern themselves with the
intricacies of lethal injection procedures. Thus, as
Justice Stevens explained, “[t]he question whether a
similar three-drug protocol may be used in other States
remains open, and may well be answered differently in a
future case on the basis of a more complete record.” Id.
at 71 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
The development of such records is critical. History
demonstrates that the lethal injection protocols that
prison officials created or modified embodied
constitutionally unacceptable risks. Even when faced
with evidence of botched executions involving the exact
same combination of drugs, States have proceeded to use
the protocol. Closer examination of such procedures was
(and remains) hindered and, in some cases, foreclosed by
the secretive nature in which prison officials develop and
ultimately carry out their lethal injection protocols.
Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. at 121–23; Eric Berger,
Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due
Process, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1367, 1388–95 (2014). The
rigorous scientific examination required to prevent
unnecessary pain and needless suffering will occur only
if this Court reinforces the necessity of Eighth
Amendment review of prison officials’ chosen lethal
injection drugs and procedures.
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II. THE
SIXTH
CIRCUIT’S
DECISION
EFFECTIVELY FORECLOSES JUDICIAL
SCRUTINY OF EXECUTION METHODS AND
IS CONTRARY TO STATES’ HISTORICAL
EXPERIMENTATION WITH EXECUTION
METHODS.
The Sixth Circuit’s finding that Petitioner failed to
carry his burden under Glossip’s second prong—
identification of an available, feasible execution method
that can be readily implemented—because Ohio may
decline to be the first State to use a reliable and humane
lethal injection protocol in the context of an execution
effectively forecloses the judicial scrutiny that is critical
to developing more humane execution methods and is
contrary to States’ historical experimentation with
execution methods. As established in Section I, supra,
careful judicial review of States’ evolving execution
methods is required to ensure compliance with the
Eighth Amendment. If left standing, the Sixth Circuit’s
decision not only would eliminate that crucial safeguard
of an individual’s Eighth Amendment rights, but it is
also in tension with the practical reality of how lethal
injection methods are developed. States—including
Ohio—have frequently and brazenly experimented with
execution methods. This frequent experimentation
belies any State’s claimed reticence to implement a
protocol proposed by an inmate. To this end, States
should not be permitted to categorically reject an
inmate’s proposed alternative execution method merely
on the basis that another State has not used the method
in an execution. Ohio’s categorical rejection of
Petitioner’s proposed alternative method—lethal
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injection by secobarbital—is particularly problematic
given that secobarbital is the most common drug used in
physician-assisted suicides in the United States.
If there has been one consistent theme in our
country’s approach to executions, it is its
experimentation. States have abandoned and adopted
execution methods with alacrity. As soon as an older
method no longer proved tenable, officials have adopted
new protocols. This practice of experimentation
necessitates robust judicial review of the new methods,
to ensure that the new method does not inflict
unnecessary pain and needless suffering, see supra
Section I.C., but it is also necessary to facilitating the
introduction of more humane methods of execution.
Despite this history, the Sixth Circuit would halt this
important search for more humane execution methods
and foreclose the judicial scrutiny required to determine
a State’s compliance with the Eighth Amendment. In
rejecting Petitioner’s claim that secobarbital is a viable
alternative to midazolam, the Sixth Circuit concluded
that Ohio’s desire “not to be the first [state] to
experiment with a new method of execution” was a
legitimate reason for Ohio to reject it as an alternative.
In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation, 946 F.3d 287,
291 (2019). But the Court in Glossip summarily rejected
the petitioner’s attempt to cast the country’s slow
adoption of midazolam as evidence that the drug was
unsuitable for executions. 576 U.S. at 891–92. According
to the Court, “[t]hat argument, if accepted, would
hamper the adoption of new and potentially more
humane methods of execution and would prevent States
from adapting to changes in the availability of suitable
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drugs.” Id. By the same token, allowing States to reject
a proposed alternative method merely because another
State has not used it in an execution renders this Court’s
two-prong test in Glossip a dead letter and forecloses
the judicial review required to aid that search for more
humane methods.
The Sixth Circuit’s logic contradicts historical
practice. States, and Ohio in particular, have historically
adopted new methods of execution that have not
previously been used by another State. As noted by
Petitioner, Ohio has “been the State most willing to try
new executions methods” when it became the first State
(1) to adopt a one-drug protocol using sodium thiopental,
(2) to use a one-drug protocol with pentobarbital, and (3)
to use a two-drug protocol with midazolam and
hydromorphone.
Pet’r’s Br. 21–22 n.6. States’
experimentation with new methods even dates back to
the end of the 19th century. When New York replaced
hanging with electrocution, no death row inmate had
ever been executed by electric chair, and the electric
chair had not even been invented. Banner, supra, at 181;
Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 71–74. Likewise, no other
State employed lethal gas as an execution method when
Nevada made its switch out of a desire to take a more
humane approach. Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 83. Within
thirty-five years, another ten States would follow
Nevada’s lead. Id. And Oklahoma employed both a novel
method and novel drug cocktail in replacing
electrocution with lethal injection, in an effort described
by the initiative’s sponsor “to make the execution less
violent and a little more quiet.” Denno, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. at 66–71; Tim Barker, Author of Lethal Injection
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Bill Recalls His Motive, TULSA WORLD (Sept. 7, 1990),
http://www.tulsaworld.com/archives/author-of-lethal-in
jection-bill-recalls-his-motive/article_90c3f8c3-22c55cd7-8d0c-42fb17378968.html.
This
spirit
of
experimentation has continued to this day in the
numerous States that have rejected the national trend
toward midazolam and instead adopted protocols that
their peers have yet to test. See supra pp. 16–17.
Ohio’s categorical rejection of secobarbital is
particularly irrational given that the drug is frequently
used in physician-assisted suicides. Jennie Dear, The
Doctors Who Invented a New Way to Help People Die,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/
health/archive/2019/01/medical-aid-in-dying-medica
tions/580591/ (“For years, the two barbiturates widely
considered the best drugs for hastening death in
terminally ill patients were pentobarbital and
secobarbital.”). Ohio’s claimed reticence to use
secobarbital because no other State has used it in an
execution rings hollow where Ohio has frequently
experimented with drugs that have a far thinner track
record than secobarbital. The mere fact that the drug
has not been used in an execution should hardly be
sufficient on its own to foreclose Petitioner’s challenge.
To prevent this incoherent result, States should not
be permitted to categorically reject alternative methods
of execution on the basis that the method has not
previously been used in an execution. Holding otherwise
would foreclose judicial scrutiny of execution methods
and cut short the critical search for more humane
execution methods.
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CONCLUSION
The Court should grant the petition for a writ of
certiorari.
August 31, 2020
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